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Davis: Unassigned Oil and Gas Interests in Bankruptcy

UNASSIGNED OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
IN BANKRUPTCY

Tony M. Davis*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In oil and gas bankruptcy proceedings,1 disputes frequently arise be-

tween non-debtor entities seeking to enforce pre-petition2 rights to receive assignments of oil and gas working interests3 and bankruptcy
trustees4 seeking to retain these interests for the benefit of the estate's
creditors. The Trustee will typically seek to retain such interests by characterizing the non-debtor entity's right to receive an assignment as a

property right which, if not of record, can be "avoided" under section
544 of the Code,5 or as a contract right which can be "rejected" under
* Associate, Conner & Winters, Tulsa, Oklahoma; B.A., University of Minnesota at Morris;
J.D., University of Virginia,
I. Bankruptcy proceedings are governed by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982
& Supp. I 1983, Supp. 111984, Supp. III 1985), enacted by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 [hereinafter the "1984 Amendments"] and the Bankruptcy
Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554 [hereinafter the
current law or the "Code"]. References to "prior" or "pre-Code" law shall mean the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Act of July 1, 1989, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (amended 1938) and Act of
July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 354, 84 Stat. 468, which governed bankruptcy law prior to the substantial
amendments introduced in 1978 (the "1978 Amendments").
2. Bankruptcy proceedings are commenced by the filing of a petition. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate, which is
essentially comprised of all the debtor's property. See generally id. § 541.
3. A working interest in an oil and gas property is an operating interest, or an interest that
bears a share of the cost of development and exploration of the property. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, Oil. AND GAS LAW 593, 979 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. This article will focus on the working interest held by a lessee under an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma,
although various types of oil and gas interests exist. See generally WILLIAMS & MEYERS at § 202.
4. In general, the trustee is responsible for administering the estate, in both chapter 7 liquidation proceedings, II U.S.C. § 704 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and chapter 11 reorganization proceedings, id. § 1106, of the Code. The debtor or trustee may retain possession of the assets of the estate
in a chapter II proceeding. Id. § 1107. For purposes of this article, the debtor-in-possession has the
same rights, powers, and duties as the trustee. Hereinafter, the trustee or debtor-in-possession shall
be referred to as the "Trustee."
5. See infra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
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section 365 of the Code.6 Analysis of the non-debtor entity's ability to
withstand the Trustee's attack is complex, in part because of the uncertain characterization of oil and gas working interests under state law,
particularly in Oklahoma, but also because of the uncertain application
of sections 544 and 365 to rights to receive assignments in general.7
II.
A.

STRONG-ARM ANALYSIS

Overview of Trustee's Strong-Arm Powers

In addition to the Trustee's power to reject executory contracts8 and
to set aside preferential and fraudulent transfers,9 additional powers
under section 544 enable the Trustee to marshal and increase potential
assets of the estate.' 0 These powers have resulted in the characterization
of section 544 as the "Strong-Arm Clause." As one commentator noted:
[T]he provision was designed from the beginning to strike down secret
liens and other transfers that prior thereto had evaded the trustee's
attack .... [and] [w]herever under the applicable law such a creditor

or bona fide purchaser might prevail over prior transfers, liens, encumbrances or the like, the trustee will also prevail."
6. See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
7. Excellent general discussions of this and other oil and gas insolvency law issues can be
found in Baker & Schiffman, Effect of Bankruptcy Law on Specific Oil and Gas Insolvency Problems,
35 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 187 (1984); and Gandy, Creditors'Rights and the Oil and Gas
Venture for the Nonbankruptcy Expert, 34 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1 (1983).
8. See infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text. Section 365 is probably an alternative remedy to the Trustee's strong-arm powers under § 544. McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 17-18 (3d
Cir. 1982) (dictum); Hunts Point Tomato Co. v. Roman Crest Fruit, Inc. (In re Roman Crest Fruit,
Inc.), 35 Bankr. 939, 947-49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Seidle v. Aeroservice Int'l, Inc. (In re Belize
Airways, Ltd.), 12 Bankr. 387, 390 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Epling, Treatment of Land Sales Calltracts Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 62-63 (1982).
9. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. Section 544(a) provides that:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to any
knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
by(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement
of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial
lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such
a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement
of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an execution
against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a
creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the
status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists,
Id. § 544(a).
11. 4 COI.I.I'R ON BANKRUPrCY , 544.01, at 544-3 (15th ed. Supp. 1985) (footnotes omitted)
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The "strong-arm power" of section 544 empowers the Trustee to
assume the fights of a judicial lien creditor. t2 The judicial lien afforded
to the Trustee includes a lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration,
or other legal or equitable process or proceeding.13 Thus, while the
Trustee may not obtain a judgment lien on an oil and gas lease, 14 the
Trustee would presumably be able to obtain a lien through execution and
levy.
An additional "strong-arm power" bestows the Trustee with the
fights of a creditor who has had an execution returned unsatisfied.15
Thus, under state laws, such as Oklahoma, which require that the execution first be delivered against goods and chattels and thereafter on the
realty if the levy was unsuccessful,1 6 the Trustee will be deemed to have
had his execution already directed against the goods and chattels and
returned unsatisfied.
Brent Explorations,Inc. v. KarstEnterprises,Inc. (In re Brent Explorations, Inc.)"7 provides an example of the application of the Trustee's
strong-arm powers to the oil and gas industry. In Brent, the debtor assigned production proceeds from an oil and gas well to a trade supplier,
Karst, in exchange for lien releases. Karst agreed not to record the assignment so that the purchaser would not suspend production. Payments were made pursuant to the assignment up until shortly before
bankruptcy. Subsequent to bankruptcy, the Trustee asserted the strongarm powers as a means of avoiding the assignment.
The court indicated that it was unable to determine whether the
assignment of production constituted real or personal property. However, the court concluded that if it was real property, the assignment
would have to be recorded to defeat the Trustee's status under subsection
544(a)(3). If the assignment was personal property, a financing state[hereinafter COLLIER]. The statutory language introduced by the 1978 Amendments clarifies that
the Trustee enjoys the status conferred by 11 U.S.C. § 544 even where an actual creditor or bona fide
purchaser may not exist. See COLLIER at 544-2-3 n.3.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
13. Id. § 101(30). Federal law establishes the Trustee's status as lien creditor, creditor with
execution returned unsatisfied, and bona fide purchaser. See, eg., Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1940). The Trustee's priority, given his status under 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(a), is determined by the substantive law of the jurisdiction governing the property in question.
Woodson v. Utica Square Nat'l Bank (In re McClain), 447 F.2d 241, 243-44 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Seymour v. Wildgen, 137 F.2d 160, 161 (10th Cir. 1943). See generally
COLLIER, supra note 11, at 544.02, at 544-8-9.
14. First Nat'l Bank of Healdton v. Dunlap, 122 Okla. 288, 291, 254 P. 729, 732 (1927).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 751 (1981).
17. 31 Bankr. 745 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
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ment would have to be filed under Wyoming's version of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commerical Code'" in order to defeat the Trustee's status
under subsection 544(a)(1). The court found that the assignment was
neither recorded nor perfected and was thus inferior to the Trustee's status under subsection 544(a).' 9
B. Bona Fide Purchaserof Real Property
The Trustee's strong-arm powers were strengthened considerably by
the 1978 Amendments with the addition of subsection 544(a)(3), which
confers upon the Trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser of real property. This new provision is particularly significant in Oklahoma, where
the status enjoyed by bona fide purchasers is greater than that enjoyed by
judicial lienholders2 0 In applying subsection 544(a)(3), the first issue to
be addressed is whether an oil and gas lease would be considered real
property for purposes of this subsection.
In Kenan v. Hilliard Oil and Gas, Inc. (In re George Rodman,
Inc.),"1 the bankruptcy court allowed the Trustee to avoid an improperly
perfected operator's lien under the provisions of subsection 544(a)(3),
although the issue of whether subsection 544(a)(3) was even applicable to
oil and gas leases was not raised. 2 In Busby v. U.S. Steel Corp.," the
court addressed the issue of whether the execution of an assignment of oil
and gas leases constituted a transfer for purposes of preference law, or
whether the transfer occurred when the instrument was recorded. The
district court observed that transfers of interests in oil and gas leases
under Oklahoma law must be recorded to defeat bona fide purchasers.
The court concluded that because a bona fide purchaser could obtain
from the debtor a transfer of the rights in the leases superior to the rights
of the transferee at any time prior to the date of the recording of the
assignments to the transferee, there was no actual transfer under the
preference section until the assignments from the debtor to the defendant
18. Wyo. ST AT. § 34-21-930 (1977).
19. Brent, 31 Bankr. at 747.
20. See, e.g., Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 435 (10th Cir. 1979) (recording
statutes exist to protect bona fide purchasers, not judicial lienholders); Carroll v. Holliman (In re
Holliman Drilling Co.), 336 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965) (while
an unrecorded mortgage of oil and gas leases can be defeated by a bona fide purchaser, it is superior
to the Trustee's position as a mere lien creditor).
21. 38 Bankr. 826, 829 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984).
22. The Rodman decision primarily involves the bankruptcy court's determination that operators cannot utilize the statutory lien provisions contained in OKLA. STAT. tit, 42, §§ 144-146 (1981).
23. 237 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Okla. 1965).
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were recorded.2 4
The analysis in Busby should have an even stronger application to
subsection 544(a)(3). The Trustee's strong-arm powers, including his
status as a bona fide purchaser, expressly target unrecorded transfers,25
and conveyances of oil and gas leases in Oklahoma must be recorded to
defeat bona fide purchasers.2 6 Thus, the argument is strong that oil and
gas leases would be classified as real property for purposes of subsection
544(a)(3). Using a similar analysis, the court in D & F Petroleum v.
Cascade Oil Co. (In re Cascade Oil Co.)27 concluded that oil and gas
leasehold interests in Kansas should be treated as real property for purposes of subsection 544(a)(3).2"
C. Defenses to Avoidance: Subsection 541(d) and Constructive Trusts
The 1978 Amendments also included subsection 541(d), which appears to provide some protection to holders of interests in property who
do not have record title reflecting their ownership.29 The legislative his24. Id. at 607-08 (citing Gamble v. Cornell Oil Co., 260 F.2d 860, 868 (10th Cir. 1958); Davis
v. Lewis, 187 Okla. 91, 93, 100 P.2d 994, 996 (1940)). The preference provision in question was
§ 96, the predecessor to § 547(e)(1)(A), providing that "a transfer of real property shall be deemed to
have been made.., when it became so far perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchase from the
debtor could create rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1976), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (1982).
25. COLLIER, supra note 11, at 544-45.
26. See Gamble, 260 F.2d at 868; Davis, 187 Okla. at 93, 100 P.2d at 996; see also Stone v.
Wright, 75 F.2d 457, 460 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 754 (1935).
27. 65 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986). The court rejected the idea that its decision was
inconsistent with In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co., 8 Bankr. 237 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981), see infra
notes 107-09 and accompanying text, on the basis that oil and gas interests in Kansas are categorized
as real or personal depending on the purpose of the classification. Cascade, 65 Bankr. at 41 n. 11.
28. Cascade, 65 Bankr. at 41. The Trustee must also, however, establish his status as a bona
fide purchaser. It is well established that the language in § 544(a) "without regard to any knowledge
of the Trustee" refers to the personal knowledge or actual notice that the Trustee might have, but
not to constructive notice. The Trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser may be defeated if, under
applicable state law, constructive notice exists of the interest sought to be avoided. See, e.g., McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 16-17 (3d Cir. 1982); Saghi v. Walsh (In re Gurs), 27 Bankr. 163, 165
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); Maine Nat'l Bank v. Morse (In re Morse), 30 Bankr. 52, 54 (Bankr. 1st Cir.
1983). But see Pyne v. Hartman Paving, Inc. (In re Hartman Paving, Inc.), 745 F.2d 307, 310 (4th
Cir. 1984). Oklahoma statutory law provides that "[c]onstructive notice is notice imputed by the
law to a person not having actual notice." OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 12 (1981). Also, a person with
actual notice of circumstances that would lead a prudent person to inquire as to a particular fact,
who fails to make such inquiry with reasonable diligence, will be deemed to have constructive notice
of the fact itself. Id. § 13; Burgess v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1, 336 P.2d 1077, 1080-81 (Okla. 1959).
Additionally, OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 16 (1981) provides that proper recording of conveyances of real
property will provide constructive notice. See, e.g., Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F. Supp. 963, 972 (W.D.
Okla. 1975). See also Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil, 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982), for an
example of a somewhat demanding standard for what items of record lead to a duty of further
inquiry.
29. The full text of 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) provides:
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tory makes it clear that the purpose of subsection 541(d) is to shield secondary mortgage market sales from the Trustee's avoidance powers.

Consequently, the application of subsection 541(d) to secondary mortgage market sales is well established. 3 The statute and legislative history

appear to use the secondary mortgage market only as an example. Thus,
there is an issue as to whether Congress intended that subsection 541(d)

have a broader application. 2 In Beutal v. Joanis (In re Investment Sales
Diversified, Inc.),3 the bankruptcy court concluded that subsection
541(d) was only applicable where the debtor originates first mortgages
and then sells those mortgages to investors in a national market.3 4

One case has extended the application of subsection 541(d) to unrecorded oil and gas interests. In Official Creditors'Committee of Partners
Oil Co. v. PartnersOil Co. (In re PartnersOil Co.), 3 5 numerous assignments of royalties and working interests from the debtor to certain over-

riding royalty and working interest owners had not been recorded when
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only legal title
and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real property, or an interest in
such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal title to service
or supervise the servicing of such mortgage or interest, becomes property of the estate
under subsection (a)(1) or (2) of this section only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to
such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the
debtor does not hold.
11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
30. Relevant portions of the legislative history provide:
The Seller of mortgages in the secondary mortgage market will often retain the original
mortgage notes and related documents and the seller will not endorse the notes to reflect
the sale to the purchaser. Similarly, the purchaser will often not record the purchaser's
ownership of the mortgages or interests in mortgages under State recording statutes. These
facts are irrelevant and the seller's retention of the mortgaged documents and the purchaser's decision not to record do not change the trustee's obligation to turn the mortgages
or interest in mortgages over to the purchaser ....
The purpose of § 541(d) as applied to the secondary mortgage market is therefore to make
certain that secondary market sales as they are currently structured are not subject to
challenge by bankruptcy trustees ....
124 CONG. REc. S17,413 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
31. In re Mortgage Funding, Inc., 48 Bankr. 152, 154-56 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); Colin v. Fidelity Standard Mortgage Corp. (In re Fidelity Standard Mortgage Corp.), 36 Bankr. 496, 499-501
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); In re Columbia Pac. Mortgage, Inc., 20 Bankr. 259, 264 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1981).
32. An excellent discussion of this issue, as applied to oil and gas leasehold interests, is contained in UnrecordedOil and Gas Interests, a Special Problemfor the Unwary, 1986; Subcomm. of the
Business Bankruptcy Comm. (see 6 Bus. LAW., May-June 1986, for information on how to obtain
copies).
33. 38 Bankr. 446 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
34. Id. at 449-50; see also Krasnowiecki, Miller & Ziff, The Kennedy Mortgage Co. Bankruptcy
Case: New Light Shed on the Position of Mortgage Warehousing Banks, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325,
340 (1982) (subsection 541(d) protects persons who take an assignment of the mortgage by way of
purchase, but does nothing for the person who has taken an assignment of the mortgage for purposes
of security).
35. No. 83-01577-H3-5, slip op. at 1-5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 1983).
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the bankruptcy proceedings commenced. The Creditors' Committee
filed an adversary proceeding seeking a preliminary injunction requiring
the debtor to escrow all royalty and production run payments to the unrecorded interest owners until their entitlement to such revenues could
be determined. The court found that the unrecorded interest owners had
paid in full or earned in full their interests, that legal title to the interests
in question was held by the debtor, but that the unrecorded interest owners held equitable title to the interests in question.3 6
Additionally, the court found that subsection 541(d) is not limited
to the secondary mortgage market, but extends to industries where "substantial industry practice and good reason exist to warrant the retention
of legal title by the debtor to service the underlying real property for the
benefit of the equitable title owners." 3 7 The court determined that in the
oil and gas industry, legal title to oil and gas leases is retained by operators so that they can:
(a) efficiently sell the production from the wells;
(b) efficiently police defaults by investors;
(c) avoid unnecessary filings if the well is not commerically
productive;
(d) efficiently enter into pooling and unitization agreements;
(e) efficiently pay taxes on the property; and
(f) avoid holding up development until all leases are purchased.38
The court concluded that subsection 541(d) applies to the oil and gas
industry, 39 and denied the request for a preliminary injunction on the
basis that the Creditors' Committee did not establish a sufficient
probability of recovering on the merits.'
In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.4 1 and Boyd v. Martin Exploration Co.42
also involved oil and gas interests. In Mahan & Rowsey, the would-be
assignee, GEC, entered into an oral contract with the debtor whereby
GEC was to locate and recommend oil and gas prospects to the debtor in
36. Id. at 2. Section 365 was probably not available to the Trustee because the debtor had
performed under the contract to make the assignment. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
Where the assignment has not yet been made, § 544 would still be available, to the extent not limited
by § 541(d), because the purchaser holds an unrecorded equitable interest. Manley v. Fong, 734
F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1984).
37. PartnersOil, slip. op. at 2.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3-4. The court determined that § 541(d) acted as a limitation on § 544, but cautioned
that this determination was being made only in the context of deciding the preliminary injunction
matters at issue.
41. 37 Bankr. 530 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984).
42. 56 Bankr. 776 (E.D. La. 1986).
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exchange for a finders fee and an overriding royalty interest in each lease
that the debtor acquired in the prospect areas. The bankruptcy court did
not discuss subsection 541(d), but merely indicated that section 544
speaks of property of the estate, and property that is held in trust is not
property of the estate.43 The court found that a joint adventure relationship existed between GEC and the debtor which gave rise to a fiduciary
duty on the part of the debtor with respect to GEC. The overriding royalty interests, therefore, were subject to a constructive trust and thus
were not property of the estate that could be subject to section 544.44 On
similar facts, the court in Boyd also determined that a constructive trust
could be imposed on unassigned oil and gas interests, but further stated
that the existence of a constructive trust compels the application of subsection 541(d). 45 However, the Boyd court did not reach the issue of
whether subsection 541(d) acted to limit subsection 544(a)(3). 4
In PartnersOil, the court simply found that subsection 541(d) was
applicable to the equitable interests of the unrecorded interest owners,
whereas the court in Mahan & Rowsey relied on a constructive trust theory to exclude the unassigned interests from property of the estate. The
concept that property held in trust does not become property of the estate was well established prior to the 1978 Amendments.47 However, in
analyzing the interplay between subsections 541(d) and 544(a)(3), it is
important to realize that. equitable liens or constructive trusts, under
common law, are enforceable against judicial lien creditors but are not
enforceable against bona fide purchasers. 4 Thus, the cases decided
under prior law upholding the imposition of constructive trusts against
Trustees in bankruptcy should be decided differently under current law,
if such cases involve real property, because the Trustee is now a bona fide
purchaser.
This concept was illustrated in C.R. Loup v. Great Plains Western
Ranch Co. (In re Great Plains Western Ranch Co.). 49 In GreatPlains, the
debtor held record title to a Texas ranch and a Mississippi farm. The
43. Mahan & Rowsey, 37 Bankr. at 531.
44. Id. at 531-32.
45. Boyd, 56 Bankr. at 780-81.
46. Id. at 781.
47. See, e.g., In re Kennedy & Cohen, Inc., 612 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
833 (1980); Selby v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 1979); 4A COLLIFR, supra note 11,
at 1 70.25(1) (14th ed. Supp. 1980).
48. In re Wilder, 42 Bankr. 6, 8 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983); see also Robertson v. Robertson, 654
P.2d 600, 606 (Okla. 1982); J.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Walton Trust Co., 39 Okla. 748, 753,
136 P. 769, 772 (1913).
49. 38 Bankr. 899 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
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claimants, L & M and Wilson County, asserted beneficial interests in the
properties. L & M and Wilson County further asserted rights to assignments of record title to the properties by virtue of a constructive trust
arising as a result of fraud committed by the record title holder. For
purposes of its analysis, the bankruptcy court assumed that the record
title holders did in fact defraud the plaintiffs. The court agreed that
given the existence of fraud, a constructive trust could be imposed." The
court further agreed that because the property was the subject of a trust,
it would not become property of the estate under subsection 541(d).5
However, the court found that under subsection 544(a)(3), the Trustee
can bring property into the estate if the Trustee can establish his status as
a bona fide purchaser under state law. 2 Thus, the court's holding indicates that subsection 541(d) does not act as a limitation on subsection
544(a)(3). Relying "primarily" on the analysis in Great Plains, the court
in Cascade Oil513 found that unrecorded assignments of oil and gas leasehold interests could be avoided
under subsection 544(a)(3), notwith54
541(d).
subsection
standing
In Elin v. Busche (In re Elin),5 the court also concluded that subsection 541(d) does not act as a limitation on subsection 544(a)(3). The
court observed that section 551 preserves transfers avoided under section
544 for the benefit of the estate, and that subsection 541(a)(4) brings into
the debtor's estate property preserved under section 551. Thus, the court
concluded that the interplay between sections 541, 544, and 551 enable
the Trustee to assert his bona fide purchaser status to bring into the estate property that might otherwise be excluded from the estate under the
provisions of subsection 541(d). 6
The Great Plains and Elin analyses appear to allow the Trustee to
avoid unrecorded or unassigned interests whether they are asserted under
a constructive trust theory or under the "industry practice" theory of
Partners Oily However, if the Great Plains and Elin analyses are ap50. Id. at 902-03.
51. Id. at 902.
52. Id. at 906.
53. 65 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986).
54. Id. at 39-41; see also Wilder, 42 Bankr. at 8-9. But see U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of New York
(In re Fieldcrest Homes, Inc.), 18 Bankr. 678, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
55. 20 Bankr. 1012 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 1016-17. This analysis could be criticized on the basis that § 551 preserves avoided
transfers "only with respect to property of the Estate." 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). However, under the
provisions of §§ 550 and 541(a)(3), property that is the subject of avoided transfers becomes property of the estate. See Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir. 1986).
57. Working interest purchasers asserting constructive trusts will find support under Oklahoma
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plied consistently, the Trustee could avoid equitable interests arising in
the secondary mortgage market industry and subsection 541(d) would be

written out of the Bankruptcy Code.58 Clearly, subsection 541(d) is intended to limit section 544.59 However, subsection 541(d) is inherently
at conflict with subsection 544(a)(3), and one of the two sections must be
limited. Unless Congress acts to clarify the conflict between these two
sections, courts may choose the course followed by Investment Sales Di-

versified 6" and limit subsection 541(d) to certain types of secondary
mortgage market sales.
III.

A.

EXECUTORY CONTRACT ANALYSIS

General

The Trustee's power to reject executory contracts is derived from
the Trustee's long recognized power to abandon burdensome property. 6'
Current law on the rejection of executory contracts is contained in section 365. Subsection 365(a) provides that "[tihe Trustee, subject to the
law where certain types of oil and gas participation arrangements have been found to constitute joint
ventures. McLaughlin v. Lafoon Oil Co., 446 P.2d 603, 609-10 (Okla. 1968). Joint ventures create a
fiduciary relationship. Oklahoma Co. v. O'Neil, 440 P.2d 978, 985 (Okla. 1968). A constructive
trust can be imposed if there is a breach of a fiduciary relationship. Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758,
762-63 (Okla. 1957). For several reasons, however, attempts to assert the constructive trust theory
could be more difficult than asserting the Partners Oil "industry practice" theory. First, as noted
above, under state law a constructive trust will prevail over a judicial lien creditor, but will not
prevail over a bona fide purchaser. See Robertson, 654 P.2d at 606; J.L Case Threshing, 39 Okla. at
753, 136 P. at 772; see also Turner v. Emmons & Wilson, Inc. (In re Minton Group, Inc.), 28 Bankr.
774, 788 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). Second, in Oklahoma there appears to be a requirement of active
wrongdoing on the part of the person against whom recovery is sought. Easterling v. Farris, 651
P.2d 677, 680-81 (Okla. 1982); Cacy v. Cacy, 619 P.2d 200, 202 (Okla. 1980). In addition, a mere
preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient to establish a constructive trust. Instead, it must be
established by evidence which is clear, definite, and unequivocal, or which leaves no reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the trust. Easterling,651 P.2d at 681; Luton v. Martin, 337 P.2d 442,
445 (Okla. 1959). Finally, trust funds must be "traced" to the specific property on which the constructive trust is sought to be imposed. Turley v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 62 Bankr. 46, 47 (W.D.
Okla. 1985); Bistate Oil Co., Inc. v. Heston Oil Co. (In re Heston Oil Co.), 63 Bankr. 711, 714-16
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986); Henderson v. Allred (In re Western World Funding), 54 Bankr. 470, 475
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1985).
58. The 1984 Amendments do not clarify the ambiguity. The reference in 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)
to "subsection (a) of this section" has been limited to "subsection (a)(l) or (2)." One commentator
has remarked that "[b]y excluding section 541(a)(3), which refers to property recovered under the
avoiding powers, the amendment appears to make clear that section 541 is no bar to avoidance of
equitable interests held by third parties if the avoiding powers so permit." Andrew, Real Property
Transactionsand the 1984 Bankruptcy Code Amendments, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 47, 68-69
(1985). Although the amendment gives technical strength to the Great Plains and Elin analyses, the
amendment does not resolve the conflict between §§ 541(d) and 544(a)(3).
59. See legislative history, supra note 30.
60. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
61. 2 COLLIER, supra note 11, at 365.01, at 356-58; 4A id. at q 70.43.1, at 516-17 (14th ed.
Supp. 1980).
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court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract ... of the
62
debtor.",
In Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings, the Trustee must make his

determination of whether to assume or reject an executory contract
within sixty days after the order for relief, or the contract is deemed

rejected.63 In Chapter 11 reorganizations, the Trustee generally has until
confirmation of a Plan to determine whether to assume or reject an executory contract. 64 If the Trustee elects to assume the contract and obtains
a court order approving the assumption, the non-debtor contracting
party will be protected because in order to assume the contract, the

Trustee must cure all defaults under the contract, provide compensation
for losses resulting from any defaults, and provide adequate assurance
that the debtor will be able to continue to perform under the contract.6 5

If the Trustee satisfies the requisites for assumption, but subsequently
breaches the assumed contract, the breach will be an expense of administration entitled to priority.66
If the Trustee decides to reject the contract, however, the nondebtor contracting party could be left with only a general unsecured
claim,6 7 providing little comfort to the entity seeking an assignment of a

valuable oil and gas interest. Moreover, as the discussion below will
demonstrate, both the judicially developed definition of what constitutes
an executory contract and the judicially developed requisites for rejecting
executory contracts have created problems in the area of land sale con62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
63. Id. § 365(d)(1).
64. Id. § 365(d)(2). During this period of time the non-debtor contracting party is left in limbo
concerning its rights and obligations under the contract. See generally Bordewieck, The Post-Petition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197
(1985). However, the non-debtor contracting party is not without recourse. Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(d)(2) "the court, on the request of any party to such contract ... , may order the trustee to
determine within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract .... " Usually, the Trustee will object to a motion for such an order, and will be allowed a "reasonable time"
within which to assume or reject the executory contract. PMG Corp. v. Hogan (In re Gulfco Inv.
Corp.), 520 F.2d 741, 743 (10th Cir. 1975). The test of "reasonableness" will prompt a detailed
factual inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the posture of the bankruptcy
proceedings, and the interests of the parties to the contract. Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681
F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Beker Ind. Corp., 64 Bankr. 890, 897 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986);
New England Carpet Co. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. (In re New England Carpet Co.), 18
Bankr. 514, 516 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); In re Midtown Skating Corp., 3 Bankr. 194, 198 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980). The 1984 Amendments introduced an exception to the general rule contained in
§ 365(d)(2). Under § 365(d)(4), if an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property under which
the debtor is the lessee is not assumed or rejected within 60 days after the order for relief, the lease
will be deemed rejected.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
66. Id. § 365(g)(2)(A).
67. Id. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g).
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tracts.6" Although Congress attempted to provide a legislative solution,6 9 the new statutory provisions do not clearly apply to contracts to
buy and sell oil and gas working interests in Oklahoma.
B.

Defining an Executory Contract

The term "executory contract" is not defined in the Bankruptcy
Code. According to the legislative history of section 365, executory contracts "generally include contracts on which performance remains due to
some extent on both sides." 7 0 A frequently used definition of executory
contract is that propounded by Professor Vern Countryman. Countryman states that an executory contract is one "under which the obligation
of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other. "71
However, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has adopted a
definition for executory contract that is slightly different from the Countryman definition. The Tenth Circuit definition was established in Workman v. Harrison72and King v. Baer.7 3 In Workman, the contract was a
joint venture for the development of a shopping center, under which the
debtor was obligated to provide money and hold title to the property.
Workman, the non-debtor party to the contract, was obligated to negotiate the land purchase, make the necessary arrangements for rezoning the
property, supervise construction of the shopping center, and obtain tenants for the completed project. The monies to be advanced by the debtor
were to be repaid, with ten percent interest, from the contemplated income of the project. After the debtor had been repaid with interest,
Workman and the debtor were to share the profits of the development
equally. After the land was purchased, the debtor became the subject of
bankruptcy proceedings. Through the cooperative efforts of Workman
and the debtor's Trustee, the rezoning was accomplished and construc68. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
70. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 347 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
58 (1978).
71. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part , 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973).
72. 282 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1960).
73. 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973). Workman and King utilize a
federal law definition for the term executory contract. While it seems appropriate to analyze the
parties' obligations under the contract by reference to state law, Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,
55 (1979), the determination of whether such obligations create an executory contract should be one
of federal law. Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tion was about to begin. At this point, the Trustee notified Workman
that the uncertainties facing the debtor's financial future would prevent
the debtor from completing performance of the contract.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that this
contract was "executory in nature, neither party having completely performed and the obligations of each remaining complex."' 74 The court affirmed the trial court's decision to permit rejection because "the financial
condition of [the debtor] was such as to make the project burdensome
and risky."' 75 As to Workman, the court stated that he would have a
claim equal to "the value of his contract at the date the petition of bankruptcy was filed."

76

In King v. Baer,7 7 the debtor contracted to sell a 1/64th interest in
Canadian federal oil and gas exploration permits. The non-debtor contracting party, King, had paid $260,912.05 of the total $5,218,241.00
purchase price. When the Trustee sought to reject the contract, King
argued that the 1/64th interest was a vested property interest, not an executory contract. The Tenth Circuit determined that under the Workman
definition, the purchase contract was executory in nature and could
therefore be rejected. King also argued that he was entitled to restitution
of the purchase price paid under the contract. The Tenth Circuit again
disagreed, leaving King with only a claim for breach of the contract.7 8
Although Workman and King were decided prior to the 1978
Amendments, the definition of an executory contract established by these
cases should continue to apply. 79 Furthermore, this definition appears to
have a pervasive application to the typically complex and ongoing relationships existing in the oil and gas industry. Indeed, given the broad
language of both the Countryman and Workman definitions,80 it might
be more enlightening to determine what type of relationship is not executory within the meaning of section 365.
Non-executory contracts include contracts that have terminated ac74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Workman, 282 F.2d at 699.
Id.
Id.
482 F.2d at 552.
Id. at 557.

79. Skeen v. Harms (In re Harms), 10 Bankr. 817, 820 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).

80. It is not clear that there is any practical difference between the Countryman definition,
which requires that substantial obligations remain unperformed, and the Workman definition, which
requires that "complex" obligations remain unperformed. In King, for example, King's remaining
obligation was no more "complex" than to pay the balance of the purchase price. King, 482 F.2d at
554. But see In re Harns, 10 Bankr. at 821 (certain limited partnership agreements were non-

executory under the Countryman definition, yet executory under the Workman definition).
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cording to their own terms." Also, if the debtor has breached the contract prior to filing bankruptcy, and the non-debtor contracting party has
obtained a judgment on its breach of contract claim, the contract could
be considered non-executory.82
Both the Countryman and Workman definitions indicate that a contract is not executory unless obligations remain due by both parties to the
contract. 3 Thus, courts have indicated that a contract is not executory
where the non-bankrupt party has fully rendered his performance, even

though the bankrupt has performed only partially or not at all.84 In In re
Biron, Inc.,85 the debtor had contracted to sell certain oil and gas lease-

hold interests. Although the debtor did not own all of the interests it had
contracted to sell, it nonetheless conveyed the interests it did own to the

non-debtor contracting party. The debtor then became the subject of
bankruptcy proceedings and sought to reject the contract on the basis
that it had not yet fully performed. The bankruptcy court determined

that the contract was not executory because there was no possiblity of
further performance, the debtor having conveyed all the interests it could
86
or ever would be able to convey.
81. Trigg v. Andrus (In re Trigg), 630 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir. 1980) (oil and gas leases that
have expired for failure to pay delay rentals can no longer be assumed); see also Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Game], 45 Bankr. 345, 349-50 (N.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Howard Indus., Inc., 56 Bankr.
5, 6 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); In re Crabb, 48 Bankr. 165, 167-68 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
82. Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 352 (6th Cir.) (although the
court did not use the Countryman test, the result appears consistent with the result that would have
been reached under the Countryman or Workman definition), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978); see
also In re Kendall Grove Joint Venture, 46 Bankr. 531, 533 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 59 Bankr.
407 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); In re Murtishi, 55 Bankr. 564, 568 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1985). Similarly, if
the debtor's only obligation is to pay money, the contract is not executory. Elegant Concepts, Ltd. v.
Kristiansen (In re Elegant Concepts, Ltd.), 61 Bankr. 723, 728 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (dictum).
83. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1285
(1986). The requirement of actual performance due by both parties to the contract was determinative in In re KMMCO, Inc., 40 Bankr. 976 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984). In this case, the debtor was
obligated to pay certain sums of money to the non-debtor contracting party. This obligation terminated upon the occurrence of certain enumerated events which the court determined to be conditions
subsequent. Because these conditions subsequent were not obligations, but simply events that would
excuse performance by the debtor, the court determined that no unperformed obligations existed
between the parties to the contract and thus the contract was not executory. Id. at 978-79. But see
Arrow Air v. Port Authority (In re Arrow Air, Inc.), 60 Bankr. 117, 122 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)
(determination of whether a contract is executory should not depend on whether mutual obligations
exist, but rather on whether assumption or rejection will ultimately benefit the estate and its
creditors).
84. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Clinger (In re Knutson), 563 F.2d 916, 917 n.2 (8th Cir.
1977) (dictum); Waldron v. Shell Oil Co. (In re Waldron), 36 Bankr. 633. 637 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1984) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.), cert. dismissed. 106 S. Ct. 3343
(1986).
85. 23 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
86. Id. at 242.
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In In re Soter,87 the bankruptcy court determined that a contract is
not executory unless "substantive obligations" of both parties remain unperformed. In Soter, the non-debtor vendor had performed everything
required of it under a land sale contract including delivery of the deed to
the escrow agent. The court determined that the contract was not executory because, other than the debtor-vendee's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price, the only remaining obligation was the
"ministerial" obligation of the escrow agent to deliver the deed to the
debtor."8 Other cases, however, suggest that even where the only obligation existing under the purchase agreement is the "ministerial act" of
delivering the deed, the contract is still executory.89
If the purchaser of a working interest in an oil and gas lease has paid
the purchase price for its interest, but not yet received its assignment, he
or she could argue that the only act remaining is the "ministerial act" of
making the assignment and that the purchase contract is therefore no
longer executory. In purchasing a working interest in an oil and gas well,
however, the purchaser may become obligated to pay its share of the
continuing costs of the project. These costs could include drilling, completion, and operating costs, depending on what stage of the project the
purchase occurs. In Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. v. Allman (In re Sombrero
Reef Club, Inc.), 90 purchasers of timeshare interests in a resort-marina

paid an initial purchase price, together with annual dues, for the right to
use the facilities for one week per year for thirty years. The court determined that even where the initial purchase price had been fully paid, the
obligation to pay annual dues, together with the debtor's obligation to
87. 26 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.), appeal dismissed, 31 Bankr. 986 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983).
88. Id. at 843; see also Hatoff v. Lemons & Assocs. (In re Lemons & Assocs.), 67 Bankr. 198,
216 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (where purchasers of interests in mortgages sold in secondary mortgage
market have paid the amount due, the debtor's unilateral obligation to convey title is insufficient to
render agreement executory); In re Fahnders, 66 Bankr. 94, 96 (Bankr. C.D. ill. 1986) (contract for
sale of real estate not executory where deed has been placed in escrow prior to commencement of the
case).

89. Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1982) (contract for
sale of land is executory where non-debtor vendee had deposited in escrow the funds necessary to
close, but debtor refused to convey title or surrender possession); Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise College Park, Inc.), 703 F.2d 1339, 1349 n.5 (9th Cir. 1983) (where the debtor-vendor's only remaining
obligation under certain land sale contracts was to deliver a warranty deed upon completion of
payments by the non-debtor vendees, the contracts would nonetheless still be executory); Hunts
Point Tomato Co. v. Roman Crest Fruit, Inc. (In re Roman Crest Fruit Inc.), 35 Bankr. 939, 948
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (even though "[a]ll that remained for the debtor to do at closing, upon
securing [a] written consent [from a government authority] and receiving the purchase price, was to
satisfy its warranty and representation of no liens and encumbrances and to turn over possession of
the property to the plaintiff," the contract was executory).
90. 18 Bankr. 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
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maintain and operate the facilities, rendered the timeshare purchase contracts executory.9 1 Similarly, the working interest purchaser's continuing obligation to pay well costs, together with the well operator-debtor's
obligation to operate the well, could render many contracts to purchase
working interests executory.92
C.

The Business Judgment Test

As discussed previously, the Trustee's power to reject executory
contracts is derived from the Trustee's abandonment power. As a result,
old authorities can be found for the proposition that an executory contract cannot be rejected if the Trustee does not prove that it is "burdensome." This meant so long as the estate earned a profit under the
contract, the Trustee would not be able to reject the contract, even

though rejection could allow the Trustee to pursue a greater profit under
another contract.9 3 Under current law, however, if the debtor can obtain
a better contract by rejecting the existing contract, it is appropriate for
the Trustee to exercise his "business judgment" by rejecting the existing
94
contract and pursuing the more profitable one.
91. Id. at 616-17.
92. If the working interest purchaser wished to maintain that the contract to purchase is not
executory, the purchaser should consider arguing that the contract for purchase of the working
interest and the agreement governing continuing operations are severable and not interdependent.
See In re Gardinier, Inc., 50 Bankr. 491, 493-94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (brokerage agreements
were severable from purchase and sale agreements; thus, assumption of purchase and sale agreements did not require debtor-in-possession to honor brokerage agreements as an element of its cure
obligations); cf.Jensen v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 482 (8th Cir. 1979) (security agreement executed in connection with pre-petition class action settlement was severable from settlement
agreement; thus, rejection of settlement agreement did not result in rejection of security agreement).
The degree to which the contract for purchase of the leasehold interest is severable from the operating agreement can only be determined by an examination of the contracts involved. Potentially,
there is a continuum of different relationships, ranging from two entirely separate contracts to a
completely integrated contract that calls for the investment in the prospect by the "purchaser," with
no real distinction made between the initial purchase price and the continuing drilling and completion costs. Also, if under the terms of the relationship in question, the purchaser is less a direct
participant, and more an investor, he may run afoul of an entirely different problem, See In re
Amarex, Inc., 53 Bankr. 888, 891 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (drilling program limited partners who
had filed a securities fraud suit against insiders, control persons, and underwriters found their claims
against the debtor subordinated to the claims of unsecured creditors under the automatic provisions
of§ 510(b)). But cf In re Rhine, 241 F. Supp. 86, 91 (D. Colo. 1965) (under Pre-Code bankruptcy
law, as applied to Colorado state law, a defrauded investor's right to rescind prevails over Trustee's
status as judicial lien creditor).
93. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys. Co., 278 F. 842, 843 (S.D. N.Y.
1922).
94. See Group of Inst. Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550
(1943); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (I re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1979); Carey v.
Mobil Oil Corp. (In re Tilco, Inc.), 558 F.2d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977); In re J.H. Land & Cattle
Co., 8 Bankr. 237, 238-39 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
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The Perceived Problem

In cases decided prior to the 1978 Amendments, courts determined
that contracts to buy and sell real property were executory contracts, and
that the purchaser's equitable title could therefore be divested by the
Trustee's statutory power to reject the contract.95 Further, under the

business judgment test, the Trustee could presumably reject any land sale
contract where the property subject to the contract could be sold to a

third party at a price in excess of the unpaid portion of the purchase
price under the contract.9 6
The Trustee's ability to divest a purchaser's equitable title together

with the application of the business judgment test led to harsh and capricious consequences. In Baffico v. England (In re Mercury Homes Development Co.), 97 the Trustee sought to reject a contract to sell a single
family condominium unit where the purchaser was in possession. The

court, recognizing the harsh consequences of applying the existing authorities, refused to convert the purchaser "from the role of householder
to the role of an unsecured creditor," 98 and allowed the purchaser the
remedy of specific performance. 99 The capriciousness of applying the old
authorities may be illustrated by considering the fact that a vendee who
has paid 90% of the purchase price would, under the old authorities,
receive an unsecured claim and have lost the amounts paid, while the
vendee who paid 100% of the purchase price would have received full
performance because the contract was no longer executory. These
problems led commentators" ° and the Commission on the Bankruptcy
95. Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257, 260 (1st Cir. 1963); In re Philadelphia Penn
Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1960); In re New York Investors Mutual Group Inc., 143
F. Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
96. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested, however,
that the older "burdensome" test may still be viable in land sale contract cases. 2 COLLIER, supra
note 11, at T 365.10, at 365-58. The business judgment test has been limited by a few recent cases
which have indicated that rejection must benefit creditors, not just the debtor. Bregman v. Meehan
(In re Meehan), 59 Bankr. 380, 385-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); accord Robertson v. Pierce (In re Chi-Feng
Huang), 23 Bankr. 798, 803 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (dictum); cf Waldron, 785 F.2d at 940-41 (financially secure debtor not allowed to file for bankruptcy protection where only purpose is to reject
contract); Chinichian v. Campolongo (In re Chinichian), 784 F.2d 1440, 1445-46 (9th Cir. 1986) (the
court need not consider whether rejection of contract under plan is appropriate where confirmation
of plan itself is denied because plan was not filed in good faith).
97. 4 BANKR. CT.DEC. 837 (CCR) (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1978).
98. Id. at 839.
99. Id. at 840.
100. Lacy, Land Sale Contracts iii Bankruptcy. 21 UCLA L. Ritv. 477. 484, 487 (1973): Lynn,
Bankruptcy and the Land Sales Contract: The Rights of the Vendee Vis-a-Vis the Vendor's Bankruptcy Trustee, 5 Tnx. TriCH. L. Rr-v. 677, 679-701 (1974); Note, Bankruptcy and the Land Sale
Contract, 23 CASE W. Ri.s. 393 (1972). For an analysis of this critical commentary, see In re Booth.
19 Bankr. 53, 54-57 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
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Laws of the United States 01 to suggest amendments to executory con-

tract law.
E. The Legislative Solution

Included among the 1978 Amendments were provisions for special
remedies, in the event of rejection, to purchasers under contracts for the
sale of real property. Specifically, purchasers of real property who are in
possession of the property are given what is essentially a remedy of specific performance.' 0 2

Purchasers not in possession are given the

equivalent of a vendee's lien to secure that portion of the purchase price
paid.' 0 3 Thus, by enacting remedies specifically tailored for purchasers
of real property, Congress implicitly endorsed the business judgment
test"° and directed the focus away from definitional niceties to an approach based upon common law protection of land sale contract
vendees.' 0 5
101. The Commission was created by Congress in 1970 to study and recommend changes in
bankruptcy law. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. See REPORT OF THE
COMM. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (1978) provides in pertinent part:
(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the sale of real property
under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract as
terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession of such real property.
(2) If such purchaser remains in possession(A) such purchaser shall continue to make all payments due under such
contract, but may, offset against such payments any damages occurring after the date of the rejection of such contract caused by the nonperformance
of any obligation of the debtor after such date, but such purchaser does not
have any rights against the estate on account of any damages arising after
such date from such rejection, other than such offset; and
(B) the trustee shall deliver title to such purchaser in accordance with the
provision of such contract, but is relieved of all other obligations to perform
under such contract.
Id., amended by Supp. 111984 (see infra note 137 and accompanying text for the amended version of

§ 365(i)).
103. Subsection 3650) provides:
A purchaser that treats an executory contract as terminated under subsection (i) of this
section, or a party whose executory contract to purchase real property from the debtor is
rejected and under which such party is not in possession, has a lien on the interest of the
debtor in such property for the recovery of any portion of the purchase price that such
purchaser or party has paid.
II U.S.C. § 3650) (1982).
104. Summit Land Co. v. Allen (In re Summit Land Co.), 13 Bankr. 310, 315 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981) (by not enacting provisions establishing standards for rejection, Congress left intact pre-Code
law establishing business judgment as the appropriate test).
105. Epling, Treatment of Land Sales Contracts Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 55, 58-64 (1982). But see I re Fahnders, 66 Bankr. 94, 96 n.2 (Blankr. C.D. Ill. 1986)
(dictum); In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 61-62 n.19 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982)(dictum).
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F. Application to Oil and Gas Leases in Oklahoma
In determining whether the foregoing legislative concern for vendees
will extend to would-be Oklahoma oil and gas lease vendees, defining the
terms "real property" and "in possession" will obviously be crucial.
These issues have been analyzed with respect to oil and gas leases.106 In
In re J. H. Land & Cattle Co.,107 the debtor-lessor sought to reject an oil
and gas lease. The lessee had expended time, effort, and expense in preparing to develop the properties leased, but there had been no physical
activity on any of the properties. The bankruptcy court approved the
rejection of the lease as an executory contract or unexpired lease. 10 8 The
lessee then argued that he was in possession within the meaning of subsection 365(h)(1). However, the bankruptcy court determined that under
Kansas law, an oil and gas lease does not create any vested estate in the
nature of title to the land. Instead, the lease merely conveys a license to
enter upon the land and explore for such minerals and if they are discovered, to produce and sever them. The court thus concluded that the
lessee was not entitled to the protections of subsection 365(h)(1). t0 9 The
court clearly looked to state law in analyzing the issues, although it is
somewhat unclear as to whether the decision was based on the court's
determination that the lessee had no right to possession or upon the determination that oil and gas leases are personal property.
Another approach to this issue is set forth in Summit Land Co. v.
Allen (In re Summit Land Co.). t t° The bankruptcy court determined
that "construing 'in possession' according to the abstract, sometimes rarefied, and frequently arcane precepts of state property law
is ... inappropriate" and that the legislative history of subsections 365
(i) and (0) should be analyzed to develop a federal law definition for the
term "in possession.""'tt Judge Mabey examined legislative history and
106. In addition to the Trustee's power to assume or reject executory contracts, the Trustee also
has the power to assume or reject unexpired leases. See generally I1U.S.C. § 365 (1978).
107. 8 Bankr. 237 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (applying Kansas law).
108. Id. at 239. For further discussion of whether an oil and gas lease is subject to § 365, see In
re Heston Oil Co., No. 85-C-929-B, slip op. at 3-4 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 9, 1986) (rejects analysis of J.H.
Land & Cattle and holds that oil and gas leases in Oklahoma are not subject to § 365); In re Gasoil,
Inc., 59 Bankr. 804, 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (oil and gas leases in Ohio are subject to § 365); In
re Myklebust, 26 Bankr. 582, 584 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (mineral lease of sand and gravel is
subject to § 365); Note, Rejection of Unexpired Oil and Gas Leases in Bankruptcy Proceedings: In re
J.H. Land & Cattle Co., 19 TULSA L.J. 68 (1983); see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(m) (1982 & Supp. III
1985).
109. J.H. Land & Cattle, 8 Bankr. at 239. Analogous to § 365(i), § 365(h) provides protection
to the non-debtor lessee in possession of real property subject to an unexpired lease.
110. 13 Bankr. 310 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
111. Id.at 317.
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critical commentary' 12 and concluded that "the mention of residential
buyers, consumers and the poor.., suggests a concern for buyers whose
connection with the land is in fee simple, not fractionated, and is more
productive and long term than speculative and short term," '" 3 and held

that purchasers of recreational use permits were not "in possession"
within the meaning of subsections 365(i) and (). 114 Utilizing the federal
law approach suggested by Summit would result in a non-debtor farmee
under an executory farmout agreement" 5 being deprived of the protec-

tions afforded by subsection 365(i). A farmee's oil and gas working interest is clearly fractionated and also somewhat speculative. Further, such
an interest is "a base or qualified fee, i.e., an estate in real property hav' 16
ing the nature of a fee, but not a fee simple absolute." "
Even under the state law analysis suggested by JH.Land & Cattle,

a farmee might not be considered "in possession," despite the fact that
drilling operations have been conducted.

The lessee's interest in an

Oklahoma oil and gas lease is generally considered to be an incorporeal
or nonpossessory interest.' 1 7 Given the "abstract, rarefied and arcane"
Oklahoma law classifications of oil and gas leasehold interests, however,

a Trustee might successfully persuade the court to utilize the federal law
analysis contained in Summit, focus on the speculative nature of the investment and the fractionated nature of the ownership, and obtain a determination that the farmee is not in possession within the meaning of

subsection 365(i).
If the protections of subsection 365(i) are not available to working
interest purchasers due to the "in possession" requirement, they will be

forced to seek the protections of subsection 3650). However, there is still
the question of whether the term "real property" as used in subsection

3650) includes oil and gas leases. In considering this question, the treat112. Id.; see also supra notes 100-01.
113. Summit, 13 Bankr. at 318; see also Lacy, supra note 100, at 484.
114. Summit, 13 Bankr. at 318.
115. A "farmout" agreement is an agreement whereby an operator ("farmee") can "earn" an
assignment of a working interest in a well from the "farmor" by successfully drilling and completing
the well.
116. Shields v. Moffitt, 683 P.2d 530, 532-33 (Okla. 1984).
117. Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308 F.2d 875, 882 (10th Cir. 1962), rey'd per curiam on
othergrounds, 375 U.S. 160 (1963); Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 207, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918) ("The
right so granted or reserved, and held separate and apart from possession of the land itself, is an
incorporeal hereditament ... "); Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 776, 110 P. 902, 906 (1910);
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 3, at § 209, at 108-09. But see Ewert v. Robinson, 289 F. 740, 750
(8th Cir. 1923) (lessee's interest is possessory if the lease contains the words "demised and leased").
This distinction has been criticized, however, as being wholly unsound. IA W.L. SUMMERS, OIL
AND GAS § 164, at 431 (1954).
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ment of oil and gas leases under state law regarding vendees' liens might
be examined. Oklahoma law provides for both a vendor's lien for the
unpaid portion of the purchase price under a contract for the sale of real
property and a vendee's lien for the purchase price paid under a contract
for the sale of real property." 8 Both liens are valid against creditors of
the debtor, except bona fide purchasers. 1 9
In Casper v. Neubert, 2 ° the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

held that the statutory vendor's lien under Oklahoma law was available
to the seller of certain oil and gas leases. The decision is at variance with

Oklahoma decisions that have treated oil and gas leases as falling within
statutes phrased in terms of "interest in real property" or "conveyances
affecting real property," 121 but not within statutes phrased in terms of
"real property." 12 2 The Tenth Circuit brushed aside this authority by
citing a "clear statutory policy to protect vendors against the inequity of
a vendee accepting conveyance of property and refusing to pay the
purchase price." 123 The court indicated that because oil and gas lease

vendors could not avail themselves of the remedies afforded sellers under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 124 such vendors must be afforded the
125
statutory vendor's lien to avoid a gap in protection.
However, sellers under the Uniform Commerical Code are not af26
forded a statutory lien, but only the limited right of reclamation.
Moreover, the treatment of non-debtor vendors under bankruptcy law is
quite different from the treatment of non-debtor vendees.1 27 Finally, the
118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, §§ 26, 30 (1981).
119. Id. at § 28.
120. 489 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1973).
121. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 3, at § 214.2, at 170.7; id. cases cited n.3.
122. First Nat'l Bank of Healdton v. Dunlap, 122 Okla. 288, 291, 254 P. 729, 732 (1927) (oil and
gas lease is not "real estate" for purposes of the statute creating a judgment creditor's lien upon "real
estate"); State v. Shamblin, 185 Okla. 126, 129, 90 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1939) ("Being personal property, such oil and gas mining leases in Oklahoma are not taxable as real property ....");Duff v.
Keaton, 33 Okla. 92, 102-03, 124 P. 291, 294-95 (1912) (oil and gas lease is not a conveyance or sale
of real estate under probate code); accord Cate v. Archon Oil Co., 695 P. 2d 1352, 1354 n.1 (Okla.
1985) (dictum). The general classification of oil and gas leases as personal property is not, however,
without exception. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jones, 176 F.2d 737, 740-41 (10th Cir. 1949)
(although Oklahoma law does not treat oil and gas leases as real property, the policy of applying
federal taxes in a uniform manner requires that oil and gas leases be subject to federal documentary
stamp tax on transfers of real property); supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (oil and gas leases
are real property for purposes of § 544(a)(3)).
123. Casper, 489 F.2d at 546.
124. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-107 (1981).
125. Casper, 489 F.2d at 546.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-702 (1981)
(right of reclamation afforded only if written demand is made within ten days after receipt of goods
by debtor).
127. The protections of §§ 365 (i) and (j) are afforded only to non-debtor vendees. Also, where
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policies underlying Oklahoma's vendor's lien statute clearly do not outweigh the policies protecting bona fide purchasers, 2 8 and the Trustee has
the status of a bona fide purchaser. 1 9 Thus, the characterization of oil
and gas leases as "interests in real property," and not "real property," is
rejected by Casper on the basis of state law policies that are somewhat
unclear and should be largely irrelevant in answering a question that is
one of federal bankruptcy law.
An examination of bankruptcy decisions suggests a different approach. Cases decided under pre-Code law looked to the specific provisions of the contract to determine the vendee's remedies upon
rejection.13 0 In a case decided under the Code, Burke Investors v. Nite
Lite Inns (In re Nite Lite Inns),13 1 the protections of subsection 3650)
were denied to the buyer-lessor in a sale-leaseback transaction involving
motel property. The bankruptcy court based its decision on an examination of the contract in question, finding a disguised financing device set
up as a sale-leaseback for tax purposes. Because the buyer-lessor was
only investing in the property and sought no "ownership interest," it was
not entitled to the protections of subsection 365(j). t32 Nite Lite thus suggests an inquiry into the specific nature of the rights to be purchased
the assignment has not been made, as in an installment land sales contract, the non-debtor vendor
could be treated as a secured creditor, entitled to adequate protection under 11 U.S.C. § 362, but not
entitled to a cure of all defaults under § 365(b). See In re Bertelsen, 65 Bankr. 654, 658 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. 1986); In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 58-61 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). But see Speck v. First Nat'l
Bank (In re Speck), 62 Bankr. 61, 62 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 279, 280 (8th Cir. 1986).
Where the non-debtor vendor has alreidy made the assignment, as in Casper,his vendor's lien under
OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 would probably be subordinate to the Trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser
under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). See Bennemann v. Pearl (In re Pearl), 40 Bankr. 860, 865 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1984) (equitable lien available to vendees under state law subordinate to Trustee's rights as
judgment lien creditor under pre-code law). However, the vendee's lien granted by federal law under
11 U.S.C. § 3650) should prevail against the Trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser under II
U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). Hunts Point Tomato Co. v. Roman Crest Fruit, Inc. (In re Roman Crest Fruit,
Inc.), 35 Bankr. 939, 949 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Epling, supra note 8, at 63 ("To apply the avoiding powers to liens created statutorily by the Code would render these Code lien provisions
meaningless.").
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 28 (1981).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
130. Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257, 261 (1st Cir. 1963) (where the terms of
escrow created fiduciary duty with respect to down payments received, the vendee was entitled to
essentially a constructive trust); In re New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51, 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (vendee's lien was enforceable where contract for sale provided for a lien securing
the down payment and the lien was recorded).
131. 13 Bankr. 900, 909-10 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
132. Id. at 910; see also Hatoff v. Lemons & Assocs. (In re Lemons & Assocs.), 67 Bankr. 198,
215-16 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (vendees of interests in mortgages sold in secondary mortgage market
denied the protections of § 365G) because the title sought was to be held for purposes of security, not
ownership).
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under the contract and draws a distinction between an interest in the
profits to be derived from the property and ownership of the property
itself.
A similar approach was utilized in Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. v. Allman (In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc.).' 33 Having concluded that the
contracts were executory, 134 the bankruptcy court addressed the issue of
whether the timeshare purchasers were entitled to the protections of subsection 365(i). As in Nite Lite, the court looked to the nature of the
interest to be purchased by examining the specific terms of the contract.
The court found that the purchasers were not buying any interest in the
properties except the right to reserve and occupy accommodations. The
court concluded that subsection 365(i) did not apply because
"[s]ubsection (i) does not refer to an 'interest' in real property or an 'estate' in real property; it refers only to a 'sale of real property'.' 35 If a
court were to adopt the Nite Lite and Sombrero analyses, it might look to
the nature of the oil and gas working interest, determine that the parties
are more concerned with the severed minerals than with the real property itself, and deny working interest purchasers the protections of subsection 3650).
At least two commentators supported the Sombrero decision on the
basis that it was consistent with the policy underlying the changes introduced in the 1978 Amendments.' 3 6 In the 1984 Amendments, however,
Congress revised subsection 365(i) as follows:
(i)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the debtor for the
sale of real property or for the sale of a timeshare interest under a
timeshareplan, under which the purchaser is in possession, such purchaser may treat such contract as terminated, or, in the alternative,
37
may remain in possession of such real property or timeshare interest.1
Thus, Congress decided to reject the Sombrero result. In doing so, however, Congress did not opt to amend the statute by defining "real property" to include timeshare interests, nor did Congress opt to extend the
protections of subsection 365(i) to purchasers of "interests in real prop133. 18 Bankr. 612, 618 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
134. Id. at 616-17; see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
135. Sombrero, 18 Bankr. at 618.
136. Weintraub & Resnick, Rejection of Time-Share PurchaserAgreements in Bankruptcy-Let
the Buyer Bewarel, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 72, 75 (1984); Note, Treatment of Time-Share Interests Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 59 IND. L.J. 223, 243 (1984). The latter article, while concluding that timeshare
purchasers should not be afforded the protections of § 365(i), nonetheless concludes that timeshare
purchasers who receive title, unlike the purchasers in Sombrero, should be afforded the protections
of § 3650). Id. at 237.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) (Supp. 11 1984) (emphasis
added on amendments).
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erty." Instead, the terms "real property" and "timeshare interests" are
used in the conjunctive,13 1 which suggests that Congress, while deciding
that timeshare purchasers were deserving of protection, nonetheless
agreed with the Sombrero
determination that timeshare interests are not
"real property.' 39
The significant changes in executory contract law introduced by the
1978 Amendments and by the 1984 Amendments reflect a recognition by
Congress of the undesirable results that occur when the broad definition
of executory contracts and the business judgment test for rejection are
applied to certain types of contracts. Congress elected to remedy these
undesirable results, not by overruling the judicially developed definition
or business judgment test, but rather by enacting specific exceptions applicable only to the types of contracts to which application of the general

rules produced undesirable results."4 Oklahoma law does not generally
treat oil and gas leases as falling within statutes phrased specifically in
terms of "real property."' 41 Thus, purchasers of oil and gas working
interests may have a difficult time availing themselves of the protections
afforded purchasers of real property, unless they can convince courts to

apply the Casper analysis of state law vendor's liens to the federal law
vendee's lien of subsection 3650)142 or convince Congress to grant oil and
gas working interests the same special treatment enjoyed by timeshare
138. Specific definitions for the terms "timeshare interest" and "timeshare plan" were provided
in 11 U.S.C. § 101(47) (1982).
139. Sombrero, 18 Bankr. at 618; see also Lemons, 67 Bankr. at 215-16 (the protections added for
timeshare interests provide "no justification for expanding the scope of § 3650) to include all interests somehow related to real property"). While Congress may have impliedly answered the question
of whether timeshare interests are real property, the amendments do not answer the question, posed
in Summit, 13 Bankr. at 311, of whether or when purchasers of timeshare interests would be considered in possession. Also, under the current structure of the statute, a timeshare interest purchaser
not in possession will not be entitled to a lien under 11 U.S.C.§ 3656) (1982). See Andrew, supra
note 58, at 57-60. Finally, more ambiguity is created by § 365(m), also introduced by the 1984
Amendments, which provides that "[flor purposes of this section 365 and sections 541(b)(2) and
362(b)(9), leases of real property shall include any rental agreement to use real property." 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(m) (Supp. 111984). Although this provision has been cited as support for the conclusion that
oil and gas leases are subject to assumption or rejection under § 365(a), see In re Gasoil, Inc., 59
Bankr. 804, 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986), the provision would not appear to require that sales of oil
and gas leases be treated as sales of real property. For a discussion of other issues raised by the 1984
Amendments, see Solomon, Real Estate Aspects ofthe 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 90
COM. L.J. 288, 291-93 (1985).
140. The types of contracts afforded special treatment include commodity contracts, II U.S.C.
§§ 365(a), 765, 766; shopping center leases, id. § 365(b)(3); collective bargaining agreements, id.
§ 1113; and, of course, leases of real property and contracts to buy real property or timeshare interests, id. § 365(i).
141. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 108, at 97 (concluding
that Oklahoma leasehold interests will be treated as personal property, and therefore not entitled to
the protection of 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
142. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
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interests and other special contracts.143
IV.

CONCLUSION

In promulgating laws of bankruptcy, Congress cannot answer all
questions for all industries and, indeed, should probably not attempt to
do so. Congress has attempted, however, to protect certain industries
from the Trustee's power to avoid unrecorded interests and reject executory contracts. In its attempts to provide this protection, Congress has
increased the difficulty of applying federal bankruptcy law to the vagaries
of state law defined oil and gas property rights.
143. Assuming working interest purchasers can obtain the protections of § 365(j), the amount to
include in the "purchase price paid" must be determined. The purchaser will argue that purchase
price should include all joint interest costs paid. In Seawane Greens, Inc. v. Bailey, 181 N.Y.S.2d
269, 271 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958), however, the vendee's lien was limited to the monies paid under the
purchase contract, and not extended to the cost of improvements made by vendee. Furthermore, if
Congress had meant the 11 U.S.C. § 3650) (1982) lien to extend to improvements, it could have so
provided, as it did for voided transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Finally,
once the validity of and amount of the § 365(j) lien is established, priority disputes may arise with oil
and gas well mortgages, lien claimants, or even other § 365(j) lien claimants. Seidle v. Milgram (In
re 18th Ave. Dev. Corp.), 10 Bankr. 107, 109 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (competing 11 U.S.C. § 3650)
liens treated pari passu). Even without a § 365(j) lien, to the extent the working interest purchaser
has paid its proportionate share of well costs attributable to the interests now retained by the
Trustee, such purchaser could argue that these payments represent overpayments held in trust by the
debtor. See Turley v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc. (In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.), 35 Bankr. 898, 903
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (constructive trust imposed for overpayments of well costs by non-operating working interest owner), rev'd on other grounds, 62 Bankr. 46 (W.D. Okla. 1985). Finally,
although the working interest purchaser has lost his equitable right to specific performance of the
assignment, he may be entitled to an unsecured claim under 11 U.S.C. 365(g) (1982). Lubrizol
Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1285 (1986); In re Aslan, 65 Bankr. 826, 829-831 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
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